A pedagogic appraisal of the Priority Heuristic by Pratt, D et al.
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
A pedagogic appraisal of the Priority Heuristic
Dave Pratt • Ralph Levinson • Phillip Kent •
Cristina Yogui • Ramesh Kapadia
Accepted: 8 June 2012
 FIZ Karlsruhe 2012
Abstract We have explored how science and mathe-
matics teachers made decisions when confronted with a
dilemma in which a fictitious young woman, Deborah, may
choose to have an operation that might address a painful
spinal condition. We sought to explore the extent to which
psychological heuristic models, in particular the Priority
Heuristic, might successfully describe the decision-making
process of these teachers and how an analysis of the role of
personal and emotional factors in shaping the decision-
making process might inform pedagogical design. A novel
aspect of this study is that the setting in which the decision-
making process is examined contrasts sharply with those
used in psychological experiments. We found that to some
extent, even in this contrasting setting, the Priority Heu-
ristic could describe these teachers’ decision-making.
Further analysis of the transcripts yielded some insights
into limitations on scope as well the richness and com-
plexity in how personal factors were brought to bear. We
see these limitations as design opportunities for educational
intervention.
Keywords Risk  Decision making  Probability 
Simulation
1 Preamble
This study starts to develop an approach towards the
teaching of risk in schools, based on what is known about
how people think about risk and using mathematical tools
that may extend and support thinking. Psychological
research reports a prevalence of heuristic thinking in
coming to judgments about both chance and risk. Heuristic
thinking refers to the intuitive approach people employ
when reasoning about situations that are intractable either
because: (1) theory itself is limited; (2) the reasoner has
insufficient knowledge or awareness of the potential to
apply that knowledge; (3) the reasoner is not able to ana-
lyse the situation through theoretical knowledge because of
practical limitations such as the availability of time or
relevant tools. What is mostly emphasised in the psycho-
logical research is the fallibility of human reasoning, which
we see as analogous to the many studies in mathematics
education research that report misconceptions in reasoning.
Our interest is not in diagnosing misconceptions but in
considering how thinking about risk can be improved by
the teaching of appropriate conceptions and the use of
mathematical tools. Gigerenzer et al. (1999) have argued
that heuristics can provide ways of reasoning that are more
effective than analytical methods.
Unlike the typical psychological enquiry, which sets out
to identify underlying cognitive principles in human
thinking, teachers and curriculum developers are interested
in learning interventions which change thinking. The long-
term pedagogic aim of our project is to develop tasks and
tools that shape knowledge about risk. We note that psy-
chological research is founded upon ‘clinical’ methods
where the problem to which subjects respond is intention-
ally devoid of the many features and complexities that
characterize authentic risk-based decision making. Such
methods make little contribution to the nature of educa-
tional intervention (they do not claim to do so). We there-
fore ask whether heuristic thinking remains the prevalent
mode of thought in the complex settings of classrooms.
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However, the research described here does not start with
students but with mathematics and science teachers. In
such a new and unexplored area, we decided to find out first
what teachers know, not only about risk but also about its
teaching and learning. Do mathematics and science
teachers deploy the heuristic thinking described in psy-
chological research? How might they be sensitized to how
they themselves think about risk and what would they see
as the implications for teaching risk?
More specifically, we have somewhat unconventionally
designed a computer-based microworld as a probe into
current knowledge with the aim of making the reasoning
process more visible for the researchers. We analyse
whether the thinking of the teachers as expressed through
this microworld reflects that predicted by psychologists and
the extent to which heuristic thinking is robust in the face
of contextual complexity and richness. At the same time,
we search for design principles that might inform peda-
gogic theory.
2 Models for making judgements about risk
One of the earliest attempts to explain human rational
reasoning, in the face of choices involving monetary gains,
was given by the expected value theory (Friedman &
Savage, 1952). This was initially explored by Daniel Ber-
noulli (1738) who suggested replacing objective amounts
of money by expected utilities involving weights and sums.
The expected utility theory (EUT) proposes that the deci-
sion maker can choose between different options by com-
paring their expected utility values (Mongin, 1998). For
example, consider the situation in Table 1 where decision
A has two possible outcomes with given probabilities
whereas decision B has a single outcome:
Under EUT, decision A has an expected utility of:
-200 9 0.05 ? 0 9 0.95 = -10 whereas decision B has
an expected utility of -5. EUT would argue that decision B
is correct as it maximises expected utility. EUT allows a
trade-off to be made between likelihood and probability in
the way each is weighed within the overall formula. In
order to account for differences in choices due to personal
preferences, authors such as von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1947) and Savage (1954) developed the idea of
subjective expected utility that combines personal utilities
and probabilities.
However, despite these modifications the EUT model of
decision making cannot explain much human behaviour as
identified through experiments (Brandsta¨tter, Gigerenzer
and Hertwig, 2006). Alternative frameworks are offered by
models that assume heuristic thinking, in which the deci-
sion maker chooses an option that uses only part of the
information, perhaps focussing only on likelihood or only
on impact to avoid the need for a trade-off.
An example would be the use of lexicographic rules that
order outcomes and/or their probabilities according to
some criterion (or aspiration level) and stop the search once
an option has been located that satisfies this criterion
(Katsikopoulos, 2011). Priority Heuristics combine the
priority and stopping rules and unlike EUT do not
assume the need for exhaustive search (Katsikopoulos and
Gigerenzer, 2008). As Katsikopoulos and Gigerenzer put it,
‘‘more generally, instead of being based on axioms, the
Priority Heuristic models choice by incorporating psycho-
logical principles: relative evaluation, search stopped
by aspiration levels, and avoiding trade-offs’’ (p. 17).
Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) argue that people are
capable of making more efficient and robust decisions on
the basis of simple heuristics than they might be if trying to
use general-purpose strategies.
Despite the clear difference in their approaches, both
EUT and the Priority Heuristic are fundamentally based on
cognitive decisions. Sunstein (2003) argues that emotional
outcomes can override consideration of probabilities.
Loewenstein et al. (2001) and Bechara et al. (1997) call
attention to the role of emotions in other aspects of decision
making beyond perception of the situation and of the
variables involved (impacts and probabilities), arguing that
they should be treated as an important component that,
working together with our cognitive evaluations, influences
the way we think and process information.
3 Approach
We present two analyses, each based on the same body of
data. In Analysis 1, we take one of the most developed
heuristics and ask whether the model suitably predicts the
decisions and the decision-making process. Evidence will
be presented to show that, although this heuristic is
partially successful, there is a need to examine how experi-
ential and personal factors may have shaped the decision-
making process—this approach is then presented in Analysis
2. First we describe the general approach and then we report,
as a case study, Peter and Erica’s activity with the software
tool to illustrate the issues that emerged from the two analyses
(all names of teachers are anonymised).
3.1 The Priority Heuristic
Recent research (Brandsta¨tter et al., 2006; Katsikopoulos &
Gigerenzer, 2008) has focussed on trying to specify what
people attend to and the information-search procedures
they use when making risk-based decisions. According to
D. Pratt et al.
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Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006, p. 416), in the case of losses, the
Priority Heuristic describes the decision-making process as
below; to simplify the explanation, we will illustrate each
step in parentheses using the example in Table 1.
1. First, compare the minimum losses of the alternative
decisions (0 and 5 in this example). If the difference
between the two minima is at least 10 % of the
maximum loss, choose the decision associated with the
lesser of the two minimum losses. (In this example,
this difference is\10 % of the maximum loss, 200, so
move to Step 2.)
2. Otherwise, compare the probabilities of the minimum
losses of the alternative decisions (0.95 and 1). If the
two probabilities differ by more than 0.1, choose the
decision associated with the higher probability of
minimum loss. (In our example, these probabilities
differ by \0.1, so we move to Step 3.)
3. Otherwise, compare the maximum losses of the
alternative decisions (200 and 5) and choose the
decision associated with the lower maximum loss. (So,
option B is chosen, the same conclusion in this
instance as given by EUT.)
(Our paraphrasing of the heuristic.)
In the literature, the Priority Heuristic has been illus-
trated through examples like the one in Table 1 where
people are making decisions about different gambling sit-
uations with clearly specified profits or losses and proba-
bilities. Note that there is an underlying assumption that the
loss is the same as the impact or utility, which in practice
may not be the case since losses could have minor or major
consequences for any individual.
It is claimed that, under certain conditions, the Priority
Heuristic predicts the decision most people will make and
the decision-making process that they will undertake. One
limitation, recognised by Brandsta¨tter et al., is that the
Priority Heuristic may not make the correct prediction
when there is a clear difference between the expected
values,
P
all hazards ðloss  probabilityÞ; of the different
possible decisions. In our study, we arranged a few aspects
of the scenario so that the decision appeared to us to be
non-trivial. There is a recognition in the Brandsta¨tter study
that the problem representation may affect the Priority
Heuristic’s precision. In fact, the presentation of the sce-
nario in our study is intentionally radically different from
the above in terms of complexity and ambiguity; we return
to this discussion in the conclusion.
The Priority Heuristic has received close scrutiny and
several criticisms have emerged in the literature. Johnson
et al. (2008) have suggested that, although the Priority
Heuristic does capture some of characteristics of the
decision-making process, it does not reflect observed fre-
quent transitions between impacts and probabilities. They
speculate that future models will in fact abandon the search
for a single underlying heuristic. Several researchers have
reported that their analyses do not support heuristic models
that claim decisions are made on the basis of a trade-off
(Birnbaum, 2008; Hilbig, 2008; Fiedler, 2010; Rieger &
Wang, 2008).
In this paper, we explore this debate further but with a
pedagogic, rather than psychological, perspective by using
the Priority Heuristic to analyse the teachers’ decision-
making. As educationalists, our focus is on the effect of
tools that might shape decision making. We seek to iden-
tify the scope of the Priority Heuristic to model a complex
situation in which specially designed tools are made
available. In particular, we test the Priority Heuristic in
circumstances where:
1. The losses and likelihoods are not clearly specified and
may even not be easily quantifiable.
2. Contradictory evidence needs to be resolved.
3. Rich descriptions of contextual matters are provided.
4. Decisions are made after careful consideration of the
evidence and testing different possibilities through
modelling the consequences of making different
decisions.
In contrast to how the Priority Heuristic has been tested
in the reported literature, we examine its relevance to risk-
based decision making in a scenario which, though not
authentic, shares many such characteristics. As a conse-
quence, we hope to identify opportunities for educational
intervention by observing the influence of experiential and
emotional factors.
3.2 Deborah’s Dilemma
Through an iterative design process, we developed a
computer-based scenario, Deborah’s Dilemma (DD).
Mathematics and science teachers were invited to respond
to the fictitious Deborah’s difficulty in deciding whether to
have an operation that could cure a painful spinal condi-
tion. The operation might result in a number of compli-
cations described through various, and at times deliberately
conflicting, sources of information. Should Deborah choose
not to have the operation, she would need to manage her
pain level through changing her daily routines of work,
domestic and leisure activity.
Information about Deborah’s condition was set out
within the software in a deliberately personal and rich way,
Table 1 Parameters for making a choice between decisions A or B
A -200 with p = 0.05
0 with p = 0.95
B -5 with p = 1.00
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to offer different perspectives with varying levels of
authority. The information was accessed by reading text or
by watching video of Deborah talking about her condition,
how it affects her life and work, and what she had learned
from her doctors and from personal research about the
operation and its possible consequences. Table 2 gives an
illustrative sample of the extensive information provided.
Two software tools accompanied the information about
the condition. A probability simulator (Fig. 1) and a ‘Pai-
nometer’ (Fig. 2) allowed the teachers to model the pos-
sible complications to gain a sense of how often the
operation might be successful, and how often complica-
tions of varying degrees of severity might occur. The
teachers could draw on the information provided about
Deborah and her condition in order to decide what they
considered important in exploring what might happen if
she chose to have the operation and what levels of likeli-
hood should be assigned in each case. In Fig. 1, the
teachers have decided on an overall success rate for the
operation of 70 %; they have also chosen three possible
consequential hazards and assigned probabilities based on
the reports they have read about the operation. The
‘patchwork’ graph depicts as colour-coded squares how
often, in this particular run of 1,000 operations, Deborah
suffered operational failures and complications.
At the time of the data collection, the results were pre-
sented aggregated as a bar chart. As a result of observing
teachers’ decision-making we introduced the patchwork
chart in Fig. 1 to enable the user to eyeball the data while at
the same time get a sense of how the aggregated view is in
fact made up of many individual cases, each of which is a
future for Deborah.
Figure 1 includes only three complications as identified
by the teachers but the user may enter up to 8. The
underlying simulation model is quite simple though the
teachers showed little interest in how it operated. If an
operation is successful, there will be no complication.
Complications can only occur during unsuccessful opera-
tions but an unsuccessful operation may not have a com-
plication. The rate of complications occurring across all
operations (including successful ones) is that entered by the
user on the corresponding slider. (In the simulation, the
program requires the probability of a complication given
that the operation was not successful, which is calculated
by dividing the overall probability of the complication by
the probability of an unsuccessful operation. This proba-
bility is at least that entered by the user. In extreme cases,
Table 2 A small sample of the information given to teachers through
the software
On her condition Because of the gradual decomposition of
the discs one of my lower vertebrae has
slipped away from the one above causing
gradual narrowing of the spinal canal and
increasing pain
On the effect upon her
life and work
I work with a desktop computer but I can’t
sit for more than 5 min at a time
On the operation This involves grafting a bone between the
vertebrae which are out of alignment
setting up a biological response which
causes the graft to grow between the two
damaged vertebrae
On the possible
consequences
30 % of operations do not succeed…these
were the risks if the operation did not
succeed…Very serious complications
including paralysis and incontinence—
about 0.02 % (that is 2 in 10,000 cases)
Fig. 1 The probability
simulator used by the teachers
to model what might happen if
Deborah chose to have the
operation
D. Pratt et al.
123
the probability could be [1, where the user has been
inconsistent. This cannot happen with realistic figures but
the program limits the probability to 1. Each instance of an
unsuccessful operation may have one or more complica-
tions associated with it according to the probability cal-
culations above, and each complication might take place
independently of other complications. The outcome of each
instance of an operation is independent of the outcomes of
other instances of operations.)
Second, a ‘Painometer’ offered a quantified experience
of Deborah’s pain in relation to a ‘‘tolerable’’ level, as the
pain was influenced by the activities in which Deborah
engaged (Fig. 2).
In Fig. 2, the teachers have chosen three aspects of her
life, which, as inferred from the descriptions, might affect
Deborah’s lifestyle, were she not to have the operation. The
clock depicts time passing and the bar in the top right
corner oscillates up and down as her pain varies as a result
of these activities. (Although in everyday and scientific
life, level of pain is regarded as highly subjective, in the
simulation, we calculate the level of pain at each tick by
adding random noise to the sum of positive and negative
values associated with the fuzzy values given to each
activity by the user.) The variation in pain can also be seen
in the graph in the bottom right hand corner. The pai-
nometer changes height at each tick of the clock. The
frequency of the activity and its consequence in terms of
pain, as set by the user, are used as parameters within a
stochastic model to determine the amount of pain in that
tick of the clock. The teachers can also set Deborah’s
tolerance level as a reference point against which they can
judge the amount of pain. The tolerance level has no
impact on the actual level of the pain as output by the
software and only functions as a visual guide, which nev-
ertheless proved to be effective in stimulating discussion
by users about pain tolerance as a personal characteristic.
3.3 Method
Three pairs of teachers (1 science and 1 mathematics from
the same school in each pair) worked through DD and were
asked to produce specific recommendation to Deborah; the
time duration of this task was approximately 2 h (with
group discussion at the end). The teachers were all expe-
rienced and taught 11–18 years olds in schools in London.
We expected to hear more reflective views about their
decision-making and how it relates to their teaching from
experienced teachers than we might have witnessed with
recently qualified teachers (in fact, this was apparent in the
data). A researcher sat with each group to monitor dis-
cussion and only intervened to demonstrate relevant
aspects of the software, to address any technical points and
to ask questions for clarification. Under certain circum-
stances, such as when the teachers had reached a decision,
the researcher might also have intervened in order to
explore the basis of the decision in the teachers’ thinking.
Data for the analysis consists of an audio transcript and a
‘screen capture’ video record of the teacher pair’s inter-
actions with the software. From the case study with Peter
and Erica presented here, we are able to draw out issues
about the validity and scope of the Priority Heuristic and
the influence of emotional and contextual factors. This
approach enables us to report the richness and complexity
evident in the decision-making process. Of course, such an
approach is limited in terms of its statistical generalisability
but offers a meaningful narrative to the reader.
Fig. 2 The teachers used a
‘Painometer’ to model what
might happen if Deborah did not
have the operation
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4 An illustrative case: Peter and Erica’s activity
with Deborah’s Dilemma
We present in two stages the activity of Peter and Erica as
they worked on task described in Sect. 3.2. The first stage
represents the process by which Peter and Erica came to a
decision based on their interpretation of the information
given in DD. Later, we present their ongoing activity after
an intervention from one of the researchers. Italicised
comments refer to additions inserted into the protocol to
clarify its meaning.
4.1 Stage 1: Before the researcher’s intervention
Peter and Erica read the introductory information about the
Dilemma and formed an initial reaction and then expressed
some concern about the reliability of the data:
1 P: If I was Deborah I think I’d have the operation.
2 E: I agree—so we’ll go for operation first.
3 P: One study, and does not say how many people, and
just says ‘reduced’ pain.
4 E: We could assume the pain had gone completely. But
we don’t know how many people.
5 P: Now her own research…reliability, source.
6 E: Yes, that is questionable—one list from any old
website you don’t know, could be one person.
They went on to discuss the complications.
7 E: 1 in 1,000 of nerve root or spinal cord damage. 5
[referring to the fifth listed complication] is tempo-
rary and happens 1 % of the time…
8 P: Number 4 sounds scary [referring to nerve root/
spinal cord damage]…it might mean a bit of
tingling, pins and needles, which is a different level
from being in a wheelchair. But you don’t know,
and of course they can’t tell you because, when
you’re in the operating theatre, different things
happen to what was expected.
9 E: Shall we put the other one—the 1 in 500, what was
that? [checks web page] damage to trachea/oesoph-
agus—only possibly permanent, but if you can’t eat
that is significant I would say—it would worry me!
[laughs]
10 P: That sounds really horrible. Should happen \1 in
500 cases. Let’s add that one [returning to the
software tool]…call it ‘trachea damage’.
The model that Peter and Erica eventually developed is
set out in Table 3; 35 min into the investigation, Peter and
Erica ran their model, starting with one case then extending
it to 10, 100 and 10,010 trials. With a large number of
trials, the percentage of failures will tend to reflect the
probabilities inserted into the model. Nevertheless, this
often triggered discussion in which the number of failures
seemed to be more persuasive than the ratios.
11 E: That’s not bad, 17 [failures] out of 10,010. I’d take
those odds.
Peter and Erica continued to modify and run their
model, adding complications related to anaesthetic and
infection from a superbug.
12 E: 9,010 successful. And anaesthetic is 1, which
doesn’t necessarily mean dying [laughter]. And
33 superbugged—slightly horrible, but they
should have gone to a better hospital. So that
was the biggest. Nerve damage was pretty low
[referring to the number of cases of nerve
damage out of 1,000, which was 8].
13 P: But you don’t know how severe that is; it could be
anything from a sore throat up to no eating.
14 E: I have to overcome my fixation with this [laughs].
Only one had a problem with the general
anaesthetic.
15 P: I think that probably means death, or severe brain
damage, something pretty awful.
16 E: And superbug can be awful. But again, out of 990,
which have failed, only 49 people, which is 50 in
1,000, which is tiny.
17 P: And the rest just had the pain they had before.
18 E: If you had the operation without success, you had
the uncomfortable experience, but you haven’t
lost much else apart from time. At least you
haven’t gone backwards. I think she should have
it.
19 P: If I was the doctor I would still say, if she
warrants it, because there are exercises and
stuff—there are things like the special neck
brace.
20 E: Who wants to walk around with that? No.
Table 3 Complications in Peter and Erica’s model for the decision to
have the operation
Outcome Likelihood
as entered
Likelihood
as n in 10,000
Operation successful 450 in 500 9,000
Nerve damage 1 in 1,000 10
Trachea/oesophagus soreness 1 in 500 20
General anaesthetic 1 in 1,000 10
Superbug infection 1 in 400 25
The first two columns are exactly as entered by Peter and Erica. The
third column has been created in order to compare more easily the
different likelihoods entered. The model did not necessarily include
all eventualities, just those that were seen as more significant by Peter
and Erica. Although ‘death’ is not specifically mentioned, it is seen as
possibly associated with one or more of the outcomes listed as dis-
cussed in line 15
D. Pratt et al.
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21 P: I might go for the exercises.
22 E: I definitely wouldn’t.
23 P: The surgery might be very painful, the recovery, I
bet you’d have to wear a brace, and you couldn’t
eat food. I think you’d be in hospital a long time.
24 E: But would you, how do you know? It may sound
silly, but the scar is a consideration, especially for
people like me.
Erica confirms in line 18 their original intuition (line 1)
that Deborah should have the operation. At this point
(49 min into the investigation), the researcher proposed
that they begin to consider Deborah’s lifestyle through the
Painometer tool. They discussed which activities to include
and what levels to set the amount of activity and conse-
quent pain incurred.
25 E: I don’t believe her, that she does that much sport.
She didn’t seem that upset about not being able to
do sport.
26 P: It did impact on her life though.
27 E: Shall we leave it as a fair bit?
28 P: May not be higher than that, just ‘more pain’.
After 56 min, Peter and Erica ran their model of Deb-
orah’s lifestyle.
29 E: Look! [Laughter] She’s always above the toler-
ance, apart from once in a blue moon.
30 P: Yes…oh look though, it’s painful to look at isn’t it?
31 P: If it was like that you would stop doing your sport.
The researcher proposed that they experiment with dif-
ferent settings.
32 P: OK, take her sport, like I can’t do all these things.
33 E: But even if she does, she’s still above it [Sport
slider is moved to zero]—she can do lots and lots
of work and no sport and she is OK [pain level
always under the tolerance level]
34 P: You’d want the operation immediately.
Having added the sporting activity, Peter and Erica felt
even more confident that Deborah should have the opera-
tion. They continued by adding further activities to model
Deborah’s lifestyle, and remained convinced that having
the operation was the better option.
35 P: As soon as you look at this one it would make
children think she should have the operation, with
the impact on your life.
36 E: We were undecided until we started looking at the
pain.
37 P: Yes, because then you are thinking about what it
does to your life. Every day it always hurts, and
when she does sport, it always hurts when she
shops. The risky bits of the surgery might not
happen to her, but she knows every day ‘when I go
shopping it’s going to hurt me’. With the surgery
lot of things are short-term, even if you got worse
for a while then you know the end point is going to
better than you were in the first place.
38 E: When we were looking at the surgery, successful
outcome, we did not really, it wasn’t conclusive
until we looked at the pain threshold.
Peter and Erica often referred to the problem through the
eyes of their students in school (see line 35). Perhaps this is
a natural way of thinking for experienced teachers, con-
stantly looking for resources to support their teaching, or
perhaps it is because the teachers knew about our longer-
term pedagogic goal. Either way, we valued these small
insights into their thinking about teaching and learning.
Lines 37–38 give some indication of what influences Peter
and Erica in coming to this conclusion as do their later
comment (lines 39–40):
39 P: It was very good as a tool for getting the idea of
what the perceived risk is, from the surgery point
of view, which was very clinical, these are
numbers, studies have shown, research has shown,
there is not much to say about it, but then when you
looked at her real life, how the condition affects
her, the impact of that is massive.
40 E: Yeah, you forget about all the numbers and think,
‘‘Bloody hell!’’
4.2 Stage 2: After the researcher’s intervention
After 85 min of the investigation, the researcher wished to
probe Peter and Erica’s basis for their position—wondering
to what extent it was sensitive to the parameters in the
problem. Peter and Erica seemed to have reached a secure
position and could be challenged in this way (as described
in Sect. 3.3). He asked Peter and Erica to consider how far
the probabilities would need to change for them to reverse
their decision that Deborah should have the operation. As a
result, Peter and Erica reviewed the complications by
comparing again their entries into the model with the ori-
ginal text and, after running the model 10,000 times, found
complications on 50 occasions, i.e. a worse position than
prior to the operation on 1 in 200 occasions.
Noting that Peter and Erica were now aggregating the
complications as ‘being in a worse situation’, the
researcher pressed by asking what they would think if all
50 occasions involved death or impairment.
41 E: I’m slightly—if I was Deborah, and there was me
dying, that would be better than being still alive
with something horrible—do you know what I
mean, it sounds stupid, but if I’m dead I don’t care,
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but if I’m alive and feeling pain, obviously it
depends—another thing is what her family situa-
tion was, if she’s got young children, with a 1 in
200 chance, you’d rather be there for your kids,
whereas being by yourself, you know you might
have a slightly…I think I probably wouldn’t, I
dunno, I’m a bit of a…
After 100 min, Peter and Erica reviewed their position.
42 E: Oh, but she’s still got to live with that pain every
day, I’d still go for…I don’t know if I’d change my
mind…
43 P: She’s got a 1 in 200 chance of being worse off.
44 E: But she’s in pain for most of her life.
45 P: That is partly under her control; she could stop
sport for example.
46 E: Yeah, I think I’m changing my mind, but she
couldn’t stop her work; she could stop driving, but
she wouldn’t be able to carry things. Oh, we
should just have stopped when we were happy!
[laughter]
47 P: She could change her job. Probably she’s been
through some of those thoughts already. She didn’t
go straight to the doctor. She’s lived with it quite a
long time.
The intervention apparently led to Peter and Erica being
less confident about what decision Deborah should make.
They finally wrote:
48 P/E: [writing into the computer]…she can to a certain
degree control the pain by not doing certain
activities like sport but this lowers her quality of
life. If she has the operation, there is a 1 in 200
chance of her having horrible complications plus
there are other alternatives with the exercises and
the neck brace. Her personal home life would
also be a significant factor, depending on
children, etc. or if she is a carer…
5 Analysis 1: The effectiveness of the Priority Heuristic
as a predictive tool
Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006) claim that the Priority Heuristic
not only predicts the decision but also describes the deci-
sion-making process. We examine both of these claims.
5.1 Method of Analysis 1
In Analysis 1, we examined the entries the teachers made
when using the probability and painometer modelling tools
in order to establish which hazards they regarded as
significant and what likelihood of occurrence they attrib-
uted to them. We consulted the transcripts in order to check
that the entries reflected the ongoing corresponding dis-
cussion. The values that we extracted from the data were
independently verified by a second researcher from the
team.
5.2 Applying the Priority Heuristic to Peter and Erica’s
activity
Table 3 shows the possible outcomes and their likelihoods
as entered by Peter and Erica into their model of the
decision to have the operation.
In modelling Deborah’s lifestyle, Peter and Erica
entered sport, work and shopping as three activities that
impacted on her pain level. They formed the view that,
with these activities in place, Deborah would suffer almost
constant above-threshold pain.
Following the Priority Heuristic, as set out above, the
minimum loss that could be incurred is zero for a suc-
cessful operation and constant above-threshold pain if no
operation. The lower loss is zero and so the Priority Heu-
ristic predicts an initial decision that Deborah should have
the operation. However, it is unclear whether the difference
between zero loss and constant above-threshold pain is
more than 10 % of the loss incurred by death or paralysis.
If not, then the Priority Heuristic may predict a different
decision, based on the probabilities of the minimum losses,
0.9 (for the successful operation) and 1, or perhaps slightly
below 1, for the constant ongoing pain. The difference
between these two probabilities is\0.1 and so the Priority
Heuristic refers next to the maximum loss. This is pre-
sumably death or paralysis versus constant above-threshold
pain and so the prediction is a decision not to have the
operation.
In conclusion, the Priority Heuristic makes the correct
prediction for Stage 1 provided constant above-threshold
pain is regarded as an order of magnitude below the loss
associated with death or paralysis, which is perhaps rea-
sonable, though not entirely clear, given Erica’s view in
line 41.
After the researcher’s intervention, Peter and Erica
wavered towards a decision not to have the operation. An
explanation can be sought by examining the transcript, and
at the same time it is also possible to evaluate the claim that
the Priority Heuristic describes the decision-making pro-
cess (as well as predicting the actual decision).
Although Peter and Erica took an early view that Deb-
orah should have the operation (lines 1–2), they had not yet
assimilated all of the information generated by the soft-
ware, so we take continued activity as part of the process of
reaching a point where a decision might be made (activity
such as making sense of the likelihoods and judging the
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severity of the complications in lines 8–10, and such as
deciding which activities in Deborah’s life were significant
and how they should be measured in lines 25–28).
The heuristic indicates that the decision-making process
will place first priority on perceived losses. Certainly there
is substantial focus on the harms that might result from
complications arising out of the operation (lines 8–10;
12–18) and in Deborah’s lifestyle (lines 25–28). However,
there is also considerable discussion about likelihoods and
these often take place alongside discussion of losses. More
pertinently, Peter and Erica make specific reference to
losses when describing how they were making their deci-
sion. Thus, in line 18, Erica explicitly articulates how her
focus is on the possible zero loss outcome of having the
operation and uses that fact to argue for Deborah having
the operation. Similarly in lines 35–38, they clarify that the
operation became increasingly the better option when they
considered the constant pain of not having the operation,
presumably in comparison to the possible zero loss when
having the operation. Perhaps line 39 captures the senti-
ment when Erica refers to forgetting about the numbers or
probabilities. These articulations strengthen the notion that
in the end, after assimilating all of the information through
reading, discussion and modelling, Peter and Erica did in
Stage 1 seek to minimise the minimum loss, in accordance
with the Priority Heuristic.
After the intervention, Peter and Erica were encouraged
to consider that extreme complications were rather likely.
According to the Priority Heuristic, the decision should
remain the same since the minimum losses were not
affected by this re-evaluation. So, why might Peter and
Erica show signs of changing their mind? One interpretation
is that the intervention focussed thinking on likelihoods.
Another is that in fact the intervention called attention to the
maximum losses (death or paralysis) and so triggered a
range of emotions relating to possible scenarios such as
Deborah having children or being a carer. Either way, it
seems the intervention had the effect of artificially pushing
Peter and Erica into the later steps of the Priority Heuristic,
resulting directly or indirectly in the consideration of
maximum losses and a decision not to have the operation.
5.3 Applying the Priority Heuristic to the activity
of the other teachers
We report below briefly on the two other pairs of teachers.
Table 4 shows the entries made by Linda and Adrian.
When discussing not having the operation, they envisaged
a manageable level of pain but advised, ‘‘If the condition
worsens then surgery is not a prohibitively dangerous
option’’.
Linda and Adrian decided even before the modelling
activity took place that, if deciding for themselves, they
would have the operation. This was confirmed after mod-
elling. However, they took a different view if they were
making a decision on Deborah’s behalf. In these circum-
stances, they decided not to have the operation, ‘‘playing
safe; trusting the spine specialist’’.
Manageable pain might be seen as rather \10 % com-
pared to the impact of death and so the Priority Heuristic
would predict having the operation, which is consistent
with Linda and Adrian. However, when making a decision
on behalf of Deborah, Linda and Adrian switched to say
they would not advise to have the operation, consistent
with not stopping until Step 3 in the Priority Heuristic.
How might there be a difference in the operation of the
Priority Heuristic in these two situations: making a deci-
sion for yourself versus giving advice to Deborah? Perhaps
they are different. If we assume that all decisions are
ultimately made selfishly (and this is a controversial
assumption), the impact that should be entered is not the
impact on Deborah but the impact on the decision maker.
The decision maker may suffer extreme anxiety as the
result of giving advice that leads to severe consequences
but this impact is presumably less than death. The differ-
ence between the impacts of making either decision for the
decision maker on behalf of another may be seen as
somewhat less than the impact on Deborah herself and
could potentially result in a different decision.
The third pair of teachers was Tim and Neil (Table 5).
Table 4 Complications in Linda and Adrian’s model for the decision
to have the operation
Outcome Likelihood
as entered
Likelihood
as n in 10,000
Operation successful 95 in 100 9,500
Nerve damage 1 in 1,000 10
Tube damage 1 in 500 20
Anaesthetic complication 1 in 1,000 10
Superbug infection 1 in 4,000 2.5
Temporary hoarseness 1 in 100 100
Infection/fluid leak 1 in 100 100
Table 5 Complications in Tim and Neil’s model for the decision to
have the operation
Outcome Likelihood
as entered
Likelihood
as n in 10,000
Operation successful 95 out of 100 9,500
Trachea damage 1 in 500 20
Hoarseness 1 in 100 100
Nerve root 1 in 1,000 10
Infection 1 in 100 100
Anaesthetic 1 in 10,000 1
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Tim and Neil were very clear from the outset that they
would have the operation, a view that scarcely wavered
throughout the investigation. Only in extreme circum-
stances would they have considered not having the opera-
tion. The Priority Heuristic would predict a decision not to
have the operation and so in this case fails to make the
correct prediction.
The above analysis has demonstrated that the Priority
Heuristic correctly predicted the decisions and to some
extent the decision-making process of two out of three
pairs of teachers, though some issues were raised about the
scope of the heuristic in both cases. In order to understand
better the limitations of the Priority Heuristic we now
examine how emotional and experiential factors might
have influenced the teachers’ decision making in ways not
reconcilable by the Priority Heuristic.
6 Analysis 2: The influence of emotional
and experiential factors
The above analysis provides some reasons to be concerned
about the scope of the Priority Heuristic to model the
decision-making process. In Analysis 2, we focus on the
influence of emotional and experiential factors as evident
in the data.
6.1 Method of Analysis 2
The transcripts were openly coded in relation to interac-
tions with the software. By reading the transcripts and
comparing them to the recorded screen activity, one
researcher would identify initial themes. These themes
were discussed by the research team, sometimes chal-
lenged, and potential new themes or sub-themes were
proposed. These were then validated by another researcher
and discrepancies resolved. Comparisons across thematised
transcripts enabled the identification of common themes
and contradictions (Flick, 2006). Subsequently phrases
from the transcripts were grouped according to these
themes and sub-themes (Wengraf, 2001). We report below
on four themes.
6.2 Factors that shaped the decision-making process
Analysis 1 showed how the Priority Heuristic had limited
success in predicting decisions and the decision-making
process of the three pairs of teachers. In Analysis 2, we
consider how emotional and experiential factors shaped the
decision-making process and may not have been translated
into the values used in the Priority Heuristic mechanisms.
The above themes have been reported elsewhere (Pratt
et al., 2011; Levinson et al., 2011). We therefore offer in
this text illustrative material only through Peter and Erica’s
account.
6.2.1 Trustworthiness and authority
The teachers often expressed a cautious response to the
data provided. For example, in lines 5–6, Peter and Erica
refer to an Internet study as problematic, since it is not
clear how trustworthy is such information. Similar, often
even more pronounced, concerns were expressed by all
three pairs of teachers. Of course, in authentic decision
making, there is almost always a concern about the reli-
ability of the data. It is difficult to see how a mechanism
such as the Priority Heuristic could ever reflect such con-
cerns; it can capture judgments about probabilities and
impacts but cannot manage uncertainties about the infor-
mation on which estimations of probability and impact
might be based.
6.2.2 Interpretation
We intentionally designed DD to incorporate partial and
sometimes conflicting data since we felt this might trigger
responses closer to those we might observe in natural set-
tings. It was common for all three pairs of teachers to
agonize over how to resolve conflicting evidence such as
when trying to decide what probability to enter into the
model given differing values from various doctors and
consultants.
In lines 3–4, Peter and Erica express concern that the
data is from one study only and that it is not clear how
many people benefitted from reduced pain. They therefore
question the reliability of the data. As above when dis-
cussing trustworthiness, it is difficult to see how concerns
about reliability can be integrated into a model such as the
Priority Heuristic.
A different type of interpretation issue is expressed by
Peter in line 39, when he expresses how interpretation of
frequency information is somehow different when carried
out by a clinician compared to a personally involved sub-
ject. Erica’s response in line 40 is memorable.
The overriding influence in decision making of impact
over likelihood perhaps explains one aspect of the failure
of EUT to reflect actual decision making and is reflected in
the Priority Heuristic by prioritizing impact at Step 1 over
likelihood at Step 2.
6.2.3 Impact versus probability
It might have been expected that when the probabilities of
the consequences of the operation were so low, they would
be ignored. In fact, all three pairs of teachers discussed
probabilities throughout the decision-making process,
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especially when modeling what might happen if deciding
to have the operation. Nevertheless, probabilities seemed
not to have much influence over the decision making.
Rather than focusing on probabilities, Peter tends to con-
sider preventative measures to avoid the operation (lines
19, 21, 31, 32, 47) and Erica looks to avoid pain or
embarrassment (9, 38, 42, 44) and outcomes that might
impact on appearance (24). This culminates in their
explanation for their final decision (39) in terms of how the
condition affects her and its massive impact on her life
(40). After the researcher’s intervention, probabilities seem
to have more influence as shown in line 48. Perhaps the
effect of the intervention was to reinforce consideration of
probabilities resulting in a change of mind by Peter and
Erica.
This experience is consistent with the Priority Heuristic,
which places most emphasis on impacts in Step 1. The
intervention seemed to artificially push Peter and Erica
through Step 1 so that likelihoods became the focus as in
Step 2.
6.2.4 Empathy and experience
One of the most striking features of all three transcripts was
the degree of empathy that the teachers articulated either in
support of Deborah or in imagining themselves in a similar
scenario. This empathy would often trigger personal
experiences, which seems to be important in attempting to
weigh the issue especially in terms of its significance. The
teachers would refer to anecdotal material they had read or
seen on television. They would put themselves in Debo-
rah’s position and recognize the impact it could have on
their own families and children.
There are several specific instances of empathizing by
Peter and Erica. In line 14, Erica recognizes that she is
perhaps overly concerned about how the operation might
affect her eating; in line 20, she worries about wearing a
neck brace and in line 24, the appearance of a scar is a
concern for her.
The Dilemma, although contrived, seemed to spark
reactions akin to how people might respond in authentic
settings; we observed instances of the teachers imagining
themselves in such a situation or wanting to know more
information without which they felt unable to make the
decision (lines 41 and 48).
Personal experience and empathy seem to be significant
in attempting to judge the size of the impact. Perhaps
though it is exactly this emotional effort that positions
impact to the fore, ahead of the rather cold numerical fig-
ures expressed as probabilities or frequencies. This
imbalance, as it might be seen through the eyes of the EUT
model, is expressed in the Priority Heuristic by placing
impacts in Step 1 ahead of likelihoods in Step 2.
7 Deliberations about the scope of the Priority
Heuristic
Broadly speaking, much of the evidence from these three
pairs of teachers is consistent with the Priority Heuristic.
There is strong evidence that impact plays a more signifi-
cant role than probabilities with the latter becoming
emphasised in the featured case of one pair of teachers only
through the effect of an intervention by the researcher. In
another case, probabilities were strongly part of the dis-
cussion but seemed not to influence the actual decision.
The superior role of impact is a key feature of the Priority
Heuristic and is clearly one of the reasons that the Priority
Heuristic predicted accurately the decisions of two pairs of
teachers. We agree with Johnson et al. (2008) that the
Priority Heuristic does seem to capture some important
aspects of the decision-making process. Even the two
complicating circumstances (the researcher’s intervention
and the distinction between making a decision for oneself
or for Deborah) did not seem to undermine the Priority
Heuristic.
The Priority Heuristic, as with all models, hides much of
the process (Johnson et al., 2008), which is often centred on
consideration of emotionally-charged issues. We conjec-
ture that emotional responses are an essential part of the
attempt to weigh the significance of impact and the effort
involved may partially explain why impacts seem to take
precedence over probabilities (Sunstein, 2003; Loewen-
stein et al., 2001).
In the (Brandsta¨tter et al., 2006) study, impact and
probabilities were given to the participants as numbers. The
DD study therefore stands in contrast by accentuating
features of authentic risk-based decision-making and seeks
to promote through empathy exactly the emotive responses
that may need to be made in order to ‘measure’ impact. If
as a result the balance between impact and likelihood was
further weighted towards impact, it is not surprising that
the Priority Heuristic, with its accentuation on impact,
accounted rather well for the decision making of two of the
three pairs of teachers.
Why might it have failed in the third case? We turn here
to the first two themes emerging from Analysis 2, trust-
worthiness and interpretation. It was clear that the teachers
did not find it easy to hold impact and likelihood in some
sort of balance. Why should they not find such a trade-off
difficult when impact especially is so difficult, if not
impossible, to measure, necessitating perhaps some affec-
tive response, as conjectured above? One of the arguments
for the existence of the Priority Heuristic is that trading-off
demands complex conceptual activity. In fact, trading-off
requires the co-ordination of two or more variables (here,
at least impact and likelihood) as in conceptualising pro-
portion and ratio, known to be cognitively challenging.
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We suppose that in the face of such complexity, people
do indeed look for simpler methods such as the Priority
Heuristic. But it is very unlikely in our estimation that any
one such model will describe how risk-based decision
making takes place. Indeed, when the information itself is
contested as in our scenario, the Priority Heuristic may be
especially difficult to apply. We have given examples of
how the information is seen by the teachers as problem-
atical because of its dubious source, contradictory nature or
incomplete data. The findings in the Brandsta¨tter study
were based on responses to situations that were already
precisely quantified both in terms of loss (or gain) and
likelihood. Issues about reliability or interpretation were
minimised. We believe that the scope of the Priority
Heuristic to deal with complicated though perhaps more
common situations where the information itself is uncertain
is limited. In such circumstances it is likely that the par-
ticipants will find an alternative heuristic, which perhaps
for example relies on the authority of the source, as in Tim
and Neil’s decision making.
8 Implications for educational intervention
There are various limitations in our approach. We used
only three pairs of teachers, which makes statistical gen-
eralisation impossible, though, at this exploratory stage, we
draw the benefit of a high sense of validity in the richness
of the data. That validity is admittedly threatened by the
artificiality and the specificity of the scenario. Since in
practice, ultimately school children too will be faced with
pedagogic contrivances, the relationship between our
research tool, DD, and what might one day be used as a
teaching aid, is perhaps relatively close.
The above analysis demonstrates that the teachers
placed highest priority on losses (rather than probabili-
ties) and that, in two out of three cases, this was con-
sistent with the Priority Heuristic. There is some
evidence that use of the Priority Heuristic is not robust
when a simple intervention seemed to push one pair to
focus on elements of the heuristic that would normally
not have been triggered. Such a lack of robustness is not
surprising when the teachers were dealing with a com-
plex scenario with many aspects unquantified and in
mutual conflict. Nevertheless, we believe that this
uncertainty reflects common scenarios for personal
decision-making. Perhaps this lack of precision in how
well the Priority Heuristic models ‘real’ decision making
is what concerns Cokely and Kelly (2009) when they
claim from their experimental evidence that more precise
process modelling of risk choices with the Priority
Heuristic would require at least one parameter that cre-
ates variation in the search and stopping rules.
The lack of robustness materialises also in another,
perhaps more profound, way. When faced with uncertain
information, the basis for the Priority Heuristic may be
undermined and in such situations we would expect the use
of an alternative strategy. Indeed, our position is that
authentic decision making is often based on appeal to
authority and we saw some evidence of that in this study.
In some ways, the lack of robustness of the Priority Heu-
ristic might signal opportunities for the teacher, who
wishes to perturb the student’s thinking about risk. For
example, a teacher might intervene to challenge the posi-
tion a student is taking, triggering further reflection on the
student’s own decision making process.
In fact, the Priority Heuristic attempts to model how
risk-based decision making operates but does not claim that
this is how we would like things to be. As educationalists,
we seek to go one step further, asking how should we go
about teaching students so that their decision making might
be more sensitive to the issues. Both the Priority Heuristic
and our data stress that impact plays a highly significant
role in decision making compared to probabilities. In
contrast, EUT positions both with equal weighting. It
seems reasonable to suggest that it would be important
pedagogically to address this imbalance even if we would
not want to suggest that EUT is realisable in individual
decision making.
In designing the Dilemma, we massaged some of the
medical data describing the consequences of the operation
in order to present what seemed to us a non-trivial decision.
In teaching contexts, it might also be important to choose
scenarios where a clear decision is not easily made. A
strength of DD in our view is that the design takes into
account how emotion can play an important part in judging
risk in the process of decision making. The decision maker
is encouraged to reorganize information through the active
use of the probability simulator and the painometer.
Encouraging empathy not only piques curiosity but also
brings to bear emotionally-charged reactions that give the
scenario some degree of authenticity, though we recognise
it remains contrived.
One consequence of utilising a situation intentionally to
generate emotional responses is that the design investment
is targeted at just one context. Thus another limitation of
the study is the extent to which our conclusions would
apply in other scenarios. The Priority Heuristic has been
developed by researchers in settings where there was little
or no emotional involvement and yet it was concluded that
impact is typically given highest priority in decision
making. If the Priority Heuristic settings and DD are seen
as opposite ends of a dimension that measures the degree of
emotional involvement of the participants, it is interesting
that at both ends of this imaginary axis impact seems very
significant.
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In the version used with teachers, these emotions are
realised almost entirely through empathy with the impact
of the various hazards, complications of the operation and
painful activities in Deborah’s life. We are seeking better
ways of representing the probabilities or rather Deborah’s
futures. The graph in Fig. 1 is a first attempt. Perhaps
meaningful representations of how often different out-
comes might happen will enable people to judge proba-
bilities against impacts in a more balanced way.
We are not satisfied that people’s risk-based decision
making is dominated by strategies such as the Priority
Heuristic or appealing to the source with most authority.
We need to find tools that can list and order hazards by size
of risk to support co-ordinated ways of thinking so that
impact and likelihood can to some extent be traded off.
After the experiment with teachers, we implemented such a
tool and we offer it here as an example of the sort of
intervention that might be made. This hazard-mapping tool
is presented to users as a means of keeping an ongoing
‘map’ of their decisions by connecting boxes containing
information they have entered about possible hazards
(Fig. 3).
In Fig. 3, we envisage a user who has entered two
decision boxes and three hazard boxes, associated with
these decisions, as read from the information or observed
through the videos. The user has entered a description of
the chosen hazards. They might include information about
impact and likelihood but in fact can enter any information,
including ethical or moral concerns. The boxes can be
connected to illustrate any conceptual links. The user may
Fig. 3 Enhanced version of
Deborah’s Dilemma where
users can map their analysis of
the hazards
Fig. 4 The teachers would
press the risk button (bottom
right corner) and then drag the
hazards so that the depth of
color reflected the perceived
risk of each hazard. Here,
having the operation is
perceived as riskier and so this
decision and its associated
hazards have been positioned
further to the left giving them a
darker color. Similarly nerve
damage is seen as riskier than
trachea soreness
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at any time add more hazards, as they work on the
Dilemma. The boxes can be dragged around the screen but
the links will be maintained. At a later stage, the user
would be encouraged to press the ‘Show Risk’ button in the
bottom right hand corner. The boxes would change colour,
becoming darker or lighter. Boxes towards the left of the
screen would become darker while those to the right would
become lighter on a continuous scale (Fig. 4). The user is
told that the darker the hazard, the greater its risk. Inevi-
tably, a user would now judge that some of the boxes were
in the wrong position on the screen. They would be able to
drag the boxes to what they would judge to be the correct
relative position according to their estimation of the risks.
We conjecture that such tools could provide an educa-
tional intervention that would enable teachers and students
to co-ordinate the dimensions of risk into a single construct
in a process that includes the possibility that they might,
under certain circumstances, use thinking about trade-offs
rather than strategies, such as the Priority Heuristic, that
avoid them.
Teaching about risk carries with it certain obligations.
We see one pedagogic challenge as sensitising people to
their own decision making, including their emotionally-
charged heuristic thinking. It could be argued that this task
falls most naturally to the teacher of social studies. We do
not though think science and mathematics teachers can so
easily escape their obligations. Insofar as science teachers
are required to teach about socio-scientific issues and
mathematics teachers about probability, the need to
incorporate consideration of risk in this teaching is
unavoidable. In this paper, we have set out some pertinent
issues to inform the challenge of designing educational
interventions in those classrooms.
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